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The Courts' Role in Preserving the Family
Farm During Bankruptcy Proceedings
Involving FmHA Loans
Carol Ann Eiden*
Over a twelve year period, Kenneth and Lanae Fisher in-
curred three Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) loans' for
their family farm. On July 26, 1988, the Fishers filed a petition
under Chapter 12 of the bankruptcy code.2 In the reorganization
plan, the Fishers calculated the FmHA loans' repayment rate as a
weighted average of the three different interest rates at which they
had borrowed. The FmHA objected, claiming this weighted average
was too low. Yet the bankruptcy court 3 affirmed the Fishers' plan,
and the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision.4
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, reversed
these decisions, 5 interpreting Chapter 12's cramdown provision 6 as
requiring the Fishers to pay back their loans at a higher interest
rate after bankruptcy than previously. 7
* Carol Ann Eiden received her B.A. in 1990 from the College of St. Catherine,
with a double major in English and mathematics. She received her J.D. from the
University of Minnesota Law School in 1993. Her interest in family farm issues
stems from having grown up on a small dairy farm in Cologne, Minnesota; she be-
longs to the fifth generation of Eidens to have lived on this dairy farm.
1. Low-income family farmers qualify for special low interest loans offered by
the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). This government agency was estab-
lished to specifically aid low income farmers. See infra notes 42-44 and accompany-
ing text.
2. The United States Congress enacted Chapter 12 bankruptcy to help family
farmers through the present farm crisis. See also infra notes 101-17 and accompa-
nying text. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5249.
3. In re Fisher, 930 F.2d 1361, 1361 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing In re Fisher, No. 88-
05611 (Bankr. D.N.D. Jan. 25, 1989)).
4. Id. (citing In re Fisher, No. A1-89-053 (D.N.D. June 6, 1989)).
5. Id. at 1364.
6. The cramdown provision provides that if a creditor receives the present value
of the loan's secured collateral, a debtor's repayment plan may be crammed onto the
creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(b) (1988). See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying
text.
7. The original rates for the three FmHA loans were 7.25%, 4.5%, and 4.5%.
930 F.2d at 1363. The court rejected these rates as too low and held that the loans
should be repaid at the market rate. Id. at 1363, 1364.
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Fisher illustrates the power courts possess to influence the
fate of the imperiled American family farm.8 Chapter 12 bank-
ruptcy was enacted to help family farmers survive the present farm
crisis. 9 During Chapter 12 proceedings, courts, like the Fisher
court, interpret the code, thereby determining the extent of Chapter
12's protection for family farms.
This article argues that interpreting the statute to place the
farmer in greater debt after filing for bankruptcy contradicts Chap-
ter 12's purpose by hurting those farmers most in need of help.
Part I discusses the evolution of the American family farm and the
factors contributing to its demise. Part II examines statutory re-
sponses intended to relieve the plight of the family farm, including
Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceedings. Part III describes various
courts' interpretations of present "value' under the bankruptcy
code. Part IV presents a more reasonable resolution for cases like
Fisher, one which comports with Chapter 12 and satisfies underly-
ing policy considerations.
I. The Changing Face of Agriculture: Demise of an
Institution
The United States began as an agricultural nation, with the
family farm feeding and raising this country. The family farm re-
tained its central position in the American socioeconomic structure
for most of our country's history. However, the twentieth century,
hosted a dramatic decline to family farming; government programs
seeking to hinder this trend, actually accelerated the descent. In
the present agricultural economy, family farms have been displaced
by large nonfamily corporate or industrial farms. Family farmers
presently struggle to survive the worst farm crisis in the history of
the United States. The survival of the family farm in America ap-
8. As used in this article, "family farmers" consist of those people owning and
running noncorporate farms alone or with a family member or corporate farms in
which over 50% of the outstanding stock or equity is held by one family or one family
and relatives, and this family or these relatives run the farm.
9. The current farm crisis grips the entire farm economy. Land values dropped
approximately in half since 1981, resulting in undersecured loans. Neil E. Harl, The
Financial Crisis in the United States, in Is THERE A MORAL OBLGATION To SAVE
THE FAMILY FARM? 112, 113 (Gary Comstock ed., 1987). More farm foreclosures,
land contract forfeitures, and note defaults occurred than at any time since the
Great Depression. Id. The crisis affects entire rural communities. Lenders in rural
communities fight to overcome the effects of loan defaults and farm foreclosures. See
id. Sellers of farm supplies suffer from undersecured and unpaid debts. See id. The
depressed farm economy similarly hurts "main-street" retailers due to the reduced
cash flow. See id. Although the Midwest has been most severely affected by the
farm problems, when a significant segment of the population has been affected, the
effects touch the entire country.
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pears doubtful. This section details this rise and fall of the Ameri-
can family farm.
In 1790, ninety-five percent of the United States' population
lived in a rural, agricultural setting.O Hence, the agrarian tradi-
tion prevailed," and agrarian-based ideas appealed to many, as ex-
emplified by Jefferson's successful political ideology. 12 Family
farmers contributed to the expansion of the United States by pio-
neering the settlement of the West.'3 Although the "farmer's fron-
tier" pushed steadily westward in the years preceding the Civil
War, the post-Civil War decades hosted an unprecedented surge in
agriculture.'4 The 1862 Homestead ActX5 hastened settlement of
the West and stimulated massive growth in agriculture. The
number of farms grew more between 1860 and 1910 than during
any other period in American history.' 6 This flourishing, however,
sharply curbed in the twentieth century when America transformed
itself into an urban culture. The farm population continues to
plummet.17 Today, little more than one percent of Americans live
10. Richard S. Kirkendall, A History of the Family Farm, in Is THERE A MORAL
OBLIGATION To SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?, id., at 80.
11. This agrarian tradition embraces neighborly behavior; concern for future
generations; deriving dignity from hard work; and acting frugally, modestly, hon-
estly, and responsibly toward the community. MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A
NEW ECONOMIC VISION 35 (1988).
12. The family farmer played an important role in Thomas Jefferson's demo-
cratic ideology. Kirkendall, supra note 10, at 80. Agriculture's economic importance
and the plentiful land available in America helped Jefferson's democratic ideas suc-
ceed. Id. Jeffersonian agrarianism borrowed traditional agrarian ideas from Eu-
rope. Id. Such ideas promoted the superiority of farming, for example, claiming that
working on the land benefitted the human personality. Id. Jefferson fashioned
these ideas to fit his democratic philosophy. Id. He believed that work performed on
family farms cultivated the personality type essential to a democratic political sys-
tem. Id. at 81. "Jefferson felt deep attachment to the land and had an unquestion-
ing trust in the common people who tilled it"; he considered farmers "the eternal
guardians of public virtue." WINTHROP D. JOaDAN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES 162
(5th ed. 1982).
13. JORDAN, supra note 12, at 416-17.
14. Id. at 416. Between 1870 to 1900 the number of American farm acres
doubled, from 407 million to 841 million. Id.
15. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976). The Homestead
Act offered 160 acres to anyone who would settle the land and work it for five years.
Id. The act offered free public land in the West to any United States citizen or any
individual declaring an intention of becoming a citizen. Id. During the 1860s Min-
nesota set the record for the most homestead filings in a single year: 26,000. JOHN
OPIE, THE LAW OF THE LAND: Two HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN FARMLAND PoLIcY
65 (1987).
16. The number of farms increased from 2 million to 6.4 million between 1860
and 1910. Kirkendall, supra note 10, at 82.
17. A farm goes out of business in America every six minutes. Paul Hendrick-
son, Those Who Are No Longer with Us, in Is THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION To SAVE
THE FAMILY FARM?, supra note 9, at 47, 48.
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and work on family farms.18 The number of farms declined from
6.4 million in 1920 to 2.1 million in 1987.19 While the number of
farms decreases, the number of acres per farm increases. 20 Family
farms fail, and their lands are incorporated into larger corporate
farms.2 1 The average size of these corporate farms is six times that
of the average family farm.22
Corporations have grown to dominate and control the farm
economy in a number of ways. Increasingly, formerly independent
farmers work under contract arrangements for agribusiness corpo-
rations.2 3 These arrangements, such as "forward contracting,"24
create a type of price-fixing for farmers' crops. 25 Moreover, the
profits farmers receive are reduced by corporate middlepeople who
18. Kirkendall, supra note 10, at 79.
19. Bob Secter & Tracy Shryer, Farmer's Exodus of the Young; The 80's Crisis is
Over, But the Turmoil Took a Toll on Youth. Many Are Seeking Other Careers in a
Trend That Could Hasten the Ongoing Decline of Family Enterprises, L.A. TuMEs,
July 23, 1991, at Al. These figures were extracted from the 1987 U.S. Census of
Agriculture. Moreover, a 1986 study by the Office of Technology Assessment pre-
dicted that the number of farms would further plummet to 1.2 million by the year
2000 if current trends continue. Id.
20. F. Larry Leistritz & Steve H. Murdock, Financial Characteristics of Farms
and of Farm Financial Markets and Policies in the United States, in THE FARM Fi.
NANCiAL CRISIS: SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRODUCERS AND
RURAL AREAS, 13, 30 (Steve H. Murdock & F. Larry Leistritz eds., 1988).
21. Current low prices encourage large farms to swallow small farms. STRANGE,)supra note 11, at 122 ("corporate farms ... can buy land at will in a weakened
market"), 105-06 (analogizing this acquisition of failing small farms by large farms
to "barricudas ... feeding on tuna.").
22. The 1982 Census of Agriculture determined that the average size of a family
farm was 330 acres. In contrast, corporate farms possessed six times this much acre-
age. Don E. Albrecht & Steve H. Murdock, The Structural Characteristics of U.S.
Agriculture: Historical Patterns and Precursors of Producers' Adaptations to the Cri-
sis, in THE FARM FINANCIAL CRISIS: SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR PRODUCERS AND RURAL AREAS, supra note 20, at 13, 30.
23. Catherine Lerza & Michael Jacobson, Food for People, Not for Profit, in Is
THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?, supra note 9, at 238, 241.
24. "Forward contracting" describes the agreement between farmers and corpo-
rations, whereby the "conditions and volume of production as well as the price after
harvest are set in advance by food manufacturing and processing firms with grow-
ers." The Embattled Independent Farmer, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1981, § 6, at 138. In
such an arrangement, "the corporation does not become a farmer, it rents one." Id.
Agribusiness corporations have effectively subordinated formerly independent
farmers into tenant roles. Chicken processors, like Holly Farms and Safeway Foods,
acquire "cheap human labor in the form of farmers who do the growing for them."
Lerza & Jacobson, supra note 23, at 241. Decision-making authority moves off the
farm and into the hands of corporations. Kirkendall, supra note 10, at 93. Hogfarm-
ing seems to be following the route of chicken-farming. Sharon Schmickle, A Barn-
yard Dispute; Plan for Big, Businesslike Hog Operation is Criticized as Death of
Family Farming, STAR TRIB., Feb. 10, 1992, at Al.
25. This price-fixing results in both lower prices paid to farmers and higher
prices paid by consumers due to the elimination of competition. "[Slince processors
use their contract prices with higher-volume farmers as the base price for all their
crop purchases, forward contracting tends to dictate commodity prices received by all
[Vol. 11:417
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buy farmers' products and distribute them to the consumer; mid-
dlepeople withhold two-thirds of every dollar consumers pay for
farmers' food products. 26 Profits are further reduced by the grow-
ing disparity between the prices farmers receive for their products
and the prices farmers pay corporate suppliers.27
The pressures placed upon family farmers by corporations are
further intensified by the farm crisis which continues to destroy
family farming. From the late 1970s until 1981, land prices rose
while interest rates dropped.2s Banks willingly lent money to farm-
ers because rising land prices provided excellent security for the
loans. In fact, banks pressured farmers to borrow more than the
farmers, even those who do not grow under contract." Embattled Independent
Farmer, supra note 24.
When corporate domination eliminates competition, consumers end up paying
more, not less. Jim Hightower, The Case for the Family Farm, in Is THERE A MORAL
OBLIGATION TO SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?, supra note 9, at 205, 210. In 1981 the New
York Times reported that "former Federal Trade Commission economist Russell
Parker has estimated that consumer overcharges because of diminished competition
in the food industry already approach 14 billion annually, or about $200 per family.
Embattled Independent Farmer, supra note 24. The article described an example,
using the peanut industry:
A recent example of how diminished competition can raise food prices
occurred during [the 1980] peanut shortage. Processors and manufac-
turers more than doubled the price of peanut butter to the consumer
even though upwards of 90 percent of peanut farmers sold their crops
under contract to the processors at the same price as the year before.
Id. To eliminate competition and acquire a monopoly, corporate farmers often sell
products at a loss to undercut independent farmers and force them out of business.
Catherine Lerza & Michael Jacobson, Food for People, Not for Profit, in Is THERE A
MORAL OBLIGATION TO SAVE THE FAMILY FARM?, supra note 9, at 238, 242. Agribusi-
ness corporations can afford to operate a division of its business at a loss for an
extended period of time. But small farmers who specialize in producing cannot over-
come such competition, resulting in their being forced out completely or into a con-
tractual peonage operation. Id.
26. Hightower, supra note 25, at 207; CAROL GORMAN, AMERICA'S FARM CRIsis 45
(1987). Dairy prices illustrate this principle. Dairy prices reached record highs in
1989 after the "dairy buy-out." Sharon Schmickle, Dairy Farmers Soured on Declin-
ing Prices, STAR TmB., Sept. 22, 1991, at 1A, 10A. But the same year, prices plum-
meted to the lowest price paid to dairy farmers in over a decade. Id. However, the
price charged to consumers did not fall with the farmers' prices. Corporate mid-
dlepeople absorbed the excess profits. Id. In January of 1985, $.77 of the $2.00 re-
tail milk price per gallon went to middlepeople, which translates to 38.5% of the
retail price. Id. In May of 1991, $1.38 of the $2.40 retail milk price per gallon went
to middlepeople, which translates to 57.5% of the retail price being swallowed by
middlepeople. Id. In fact, during this period, although the retail price per gallon
rose $.40, the price paid to farmers fell $.21. Id.
27. Since 1952, the price farmers receive for their food products increased only
six percent, while prices charged to farmers for supplies rose 122% during the same
period. Hightower, supra note 25, at 207.
28. Land prices more than tripled their early 1970s values, and interest rates fell
below 10 percent. Nancy Blodgett, A Day in America's Courts: Saving the Family
Farm, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1, 1988, at 86, 89.
1993]
Law and Inequality
farmer originally intended.29 Farmers were encouraged to expand
in the midst of "a world food shortage and an export boom."30
Farmers took advantage of banks' eagerness to lend, often using the
loans to buy more efficient machinery. 31 This compounded their fu-
ture problems by causing overproduction. The bubble of prosperity
finally burst in the early 1980s. Land prices plummeted, some-
times to less than sixty percent of their peak value reached in 1981;
crop prices also fell because production outpaced demand,32 and the
export growth collapsed.33
The current farm crisis remains particularly dangerous to
family farms' survival because the farmers most likely to leave
farming are young farmers who run grain-producing, mid-sized
farms. 34 Most family farmers are concentrated in these mid-sized
farms.35 The average age of a farmer has climbed to fifty-two,
while the number of farmers under age twenty-five has plunged. 36
As farmers retire, the number of replacements dwindles.37
As Part II demonstrates, the government passes many stat-
utes aimed at preserving the family farm, thereby evidencing its
firm support of this institution. Valid reasons underlie this sup-
29. See STRANGE, supra note 11, at 24 (describing lenders' refusals to loan money
for modest improvements, instead, encouraging farmers to make drastic, "progres-
sive" changes).
30. Id. at 18. United States farmers welcomed increasing exports to China, the
Soviet Union, Japan, Mexico, Venezuela, Indonesia, and most of the Middle East
among others. Id. at 18-19.
31. GORMAN, supra note 26, at 33.
32. Blodgett, supra note 28, at 89.
33. STRANGE, supra note 11, at 25. President Carter's grain embargo became a
popular source of blame, but even the Reagan administration concluded this event
was not a prime reason for the export collapse. Id. at 25-26.
34. Steve H. Murdock et al., The Implications of the Current Farm Crisis for Ru-
ral America, in THE FARM FINANCIAL CIsIs: SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONS AND IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR PRODUCERS AND RURAL AREAS, supra note 20, at 141, 157.
35. Id. at 158.'
36. Secter & Shryer, supra note 19, at Al. "In short, the next generation of
would-be farmers ... are abandoning the land in droves." Id. The 1987 U.S. Census
of Agriculture showed
the average age of active farmers rose to 52, while the number of farm-
ers under the age of 25 declined 43% in just five years and the number
between the ages of 25 and 34 fell 34% during the same time frame.
Only about 1% were under 25 while nearly 30% were over 55 years of
age. What's more, there were nearly as many active farmers 70 or older
as there were those 34 or younger.
Id.
37. During Senate Agriculture Committee hearings on Mike Espy's confirmation
as Secretary of Agriculture, Senator Grassley of Iowa stated, "[T]he farming popula-
tion is aging. In my state, one-fourth of the farmers will be retiring in four years....
We have 103,000 farming units in my state. Only 3,000 are led by farmers that are
under 30 years of age." Hearing of the Senate Agriculture Committee, FNS, Jan. 14,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, FNS File.
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port. Family farmers practice better soil conservation methods
than nonfamily industrial farms. 38 Moreover, with the growth of
industrial farming comes heavier reliance on chemical pesticides
and fertilizers, endangering people's health, in addition to eroding
the soil.3 9 Water resources are also irreparably harmed by indus-
trial farming practices. 40 Industrial farms lack the personal link to
the land that inspires both valuable stewardship and better food.
4 1
Part II examines strengths and shortfalls of some of the most signif-
icant measures passed to alleviate the family farm's plight.
38. A farm passed down in the family for many generations is cared for by the
farmer as if the land was another member of the family. Carol Hodne, We Whose
Future Has Been Stolen, in Is THERE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO SAVE THE FAMILY
FARm?, supra note 9, at 54, 54-55. Because farmers devote themselves to caring for
the land and preserving it to pass on to future generations, they practice extensive
conservation practices, such as crop rotation and terracing. Id. Nonfamily indus-
trial farms, on the other hand, view land as a means to short-term profits, and thus,
do not value conservation practices. Id. at 55.
39. Marty Strange, director of the Nebraska-based Center for Rural Affairs, ex-
plained that as the number of farmers declines, causing farming to become less labor
intensive, the more farming must rely on chemical pesticides and fertilizers. Secter
& Shryer, supra note 19, at Al. He stated, "In the short-term there's mountains of
corn but in the long term there's polluted ground water, increased soil erosion and a
lot of environmental problems that are the product of trying to have a technology
substitute for human management and labor." Id.
"[L]arge-scale farms typically use herbicides and other chemicals poisons on
more than 30 percent of their acreage, compared with four percent used on smaller
farms." Embattled Independent Farmer, supra note 24. Some fear this damages the
soil's fertility. Id.
40. Industrial farms' heavy reliance on chemicals destroys precious water
resources:
According to the Nebraska Department of Health, eighty-one municipal
wells in Nebraska - about one in five - are near or above tolerable
levels of contamination from nitrate-nitrogen. The principal sources of
nitrate pollution in groundwater in that state are agricultural chemi-
cals and livestock wastes. In Iowa, environmental officials reckon that
up to half of that state's municipal water supplies are contaminated
with pesticides or other synthetic organic chemicals. Perhaps most
alarming, the heavy increase in the use of fertilizer and pesticides in
the past thirty-five years has also been epidemiologically implicated in
the high rate of certain cancers among farmers.
STRANGE, supra note 11, at 42 (citations omitted).
41. Family farmers share a unique relationship with their land.
It should not come as a surprise that the trend toward industrial
agribusiness is accompanied by degradation of land and water re-
sources. It is, after all, the stewardship of those natural resources that
has made agriculture different from industrial businesses, and it is that
difference that is eroding. If agriculture is to be made over in the image
of industry, the way land and water are used will be changed. At the
heart of the process of industrializing agriculture lie the changes in the
relationship between people and land.
Id. This unique relationship between farmers and their land also leads to a higher
quality of food. "The price, taste, and nutritional value of our own food supply de-
pends on the farm family's willingness to plow a bit of itself into the land." Hodne,
supra note 38, at 55.
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I. Congress' Farm Policies
The United States government has attempted to help the farm
economy recover in a variety of ways. Although many of these pro-
grams were promoted as saving the family farm, they actually
strengthened the huge nonfamily corporate farms at the family
farm's expense. Favorable government treatment contributes to in-
dustrial farms' power, giving them a competitive advantage over
family farms. This part explores how significant Congressional
measures affect family farms.
In 1946, the government passed the Farmers' Home Adminis-
tration Act42 to meet the needs of "limited-resource farmers." The
1946 act created the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)43 to
make loans, grants, and advice available to farmers with the lowest
farming incomes. 44 However, recently the agency has been criti-
cized for straying from this purpose.45
During the twentieth century the government sought to revi-
talize the farm economy by reducing overproduction and insuring
adequate commodity prices.46 Target price supports 47 and com-
42. Farmers' Home Administration Act of 1946, ch. 964, 60 Stat. 1062 (1946)
(current version in 7 U.S.C. §§ 1001 note, 431-36 notes, 1010 note, 1030-1031, 1032a,
12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 371 (1988)).
43. Id. §3.
44. CATHERINE LERZA, SAVING THE FAMILY FARM 29 (1980).
45. Congress called for an investigation into the lending policies of the FmHA,
led by North Dakota Senator Kent Conrad. Untitled, States News Service, Sept. 21,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File. A report from the General Ac-
counting Office explained that lals policies shifted, FmHA became a government-
subsidized free-for-all for large, corporate farms and private banks .... Small and
mid-sized farms, often the hardest hit in an agricultural downswing, have practi-
cally been left out. . . ." Id.
Statistics from the 1982 U.S. Bureau of the Census showed that in 1979 compar-
atively wealthy farmers, with over $200,000 in gross sales, accounted for more of the
FmHA's lending than the poorest farmers, with gross sales under $40,000. Luther
Tweeten, Has the Family Farm Been Treated Unjustly?, in Is THERE A MORAL OBLI-
GATiON TO SAVE THE FAMILY FARM? supra note 9, at 212, 220. In 1979 farms with
gross sales under $40,000 comprised sixty percent of all farms but only twenty-two
percent of FmHA lending. Id. In contrast, farms with gross sales of over $200,000
comprised only seven percent of all farms but twenty-three percent of all FmHA
lending. Id. Therefore, the FmHA extended more loans to wealthy farmers than
limited-resource farmers. The midsize farms between these two extremes comprised
thirty-three percent of all farms, fifty-five percent of all FmHA lending. Id.
46. Some of these programs grew out of programs developed in the New Deal era.
LEEzA, supra note 44, at 2. The Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, title I, §§ 1-22,
48 Stat. 31 (1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-620, 623-624 (1988)),
sought to reduce food production. Farmers were paid to decrease acreage used to
plant crops and reduce their livestock. The government also provided price supports
for the farmers. Farmers received loans for storing their crops as surplus with the
government. If market prices stayed below the loan price, farmers gave the govern-
ment the crop as a loan repayment. GoRmAN, supra note 26, at 19-21.
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modity loan programs 48 were created for this purpose. However,
these programs created a surplus of grain. In respouse, Congress
devised new programs to curb production by paying farmers to re-
frain from farming some of their land.49
During the 1980s, Congress instituted a variety of measures to
help the farm economy, some specifically aimed at helping the fam-
ily farmer. The effect of these measures varied. In 1986, the gov-
ernment instituted the "dairy buy-out,"5o attempting to reduce milk
production by encouraging dairy farmers to sell their herd and stop
milking in exchange for payments. 5 l While the program initially
created higher prices, dairy prices have since crashed to a shocking
low. 5 2
Many of these efforts, promoted as helping the family farmer,
actually do more to strengthen large, nonfamily industrial farms.53
However, the family farmer continues to be "used" to pass these
47. Target price support programs attempted to reduce over-production, thereby
increasing prices. The USDA administered the program. If farmers refrained from
planting a required percentage of their acreage, they became eligible for target pay-
ments. Target prices were predetermined prices set by the government. If the mar-
ket price remained lower than the target price, the government paid the farmer the
difference between the two prices. LERZA, supra note 44, at 2.
48. Commodity loans involved the government offering a loan to farmers for
specified commodities. The farmer exchanged the crops for the loan. If the farmer
could receive a higher price in the open market, the farmer sold the crop and repaid
the loan with interest. Otherwise the farmer kept the loan and gave the crops to the
government as repayment. The government retained the crops as surplus crops. Id.
49. This legislation included "set aside" and "idling" programs. GoPmAN, supra
note 26, at 51. Under the "set aside" program, farmers had to set aside ten percent of
their land used for corn and fifteen percent of their land used for wheat. However,
because few farmers signed up for the program, surpluses continued to increase and
prices fell further. Id. A similar program, called the Payment in Kind (PIK) pro-
gram, involved "idling" acres by not planting crops on them and giving some surplus
grain to farmers. Id. at 52. If farmers set aside ten to thirty percent of their crop
acreage, in addition to land already idled for price supports, the government would
give them some of its surplus crops. The farmers could then dispose of the crops as
they wished. Id.
50. LUTHER TWEETrN, FARM PoLcY ANALYsis 343 (1989).
51. To participate in the program, milk producers submitted bids for milk prices
that they would be willing to accept in exchange for agreeing to quit milking for five
years. If their bid was accepted, farmers were paid by the dairy industry and the
government not to milk, based on the volume of their past milk production. Susan
Skorupa, Cast-off Cows Create Problems for Dairies and Ranches, RocKY MTN. Bus.
J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 3.
52. Schmickle, supra note 26.
53. Family farmers acquire only a small portion of the billions of dollars the gov-
ernment claims it spends on their behalf. The government awards income and price-
support payments based on volume and acreage, essentially favoring large size and
therfore, giving the most money to farmers least in need of the financial help. Hight-
ower, supra note 25, at 208.
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programs through Congress. 54 Congress' programs encourage
farmers to iicrease their farms' size. Such expansion is "artificial"
in that true market forces do not otherwise warrant such growth.
In fact, smaller farms have repeatedly been proven more efficient
than large farms.55 "[F]arm programs, tax rules, credit services,
and other instruments of public policy are weighted to seduce indi-
vidual farmers to expand."5 6 The target price supports, commodity
loan programs, and set aside programs reward the largest farms
with the biggest sales, thereby giving farmers "artificial" incentives
to expand. Although Congress instituted limits on payments, these
limitations failed to achieve their objectives.57
In addition to the programs previously discussed, Congress
proposed two significant farm acts during the 1980s, but only one
became law. The Save the Family Farm Act,5 8 sponsored by Sena-
54. When debating the worth of government programs aimed at farmers, the
small family farmer is used to justify such aid. However, as Diane Sawyer appropri-
ately queried, "[W]ho are we kidding? Three-quarters of the subsidies, and most of
the regulations, help the biggest farmers and big business. . . ." Prime Time, Live:
Ballooning Bureaucracy (ABC television broadcast, January 21, 1993), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File.
55. A study of Iowa farms from 1976-83 concluded that small farms of 100 to 179
acres get more output per dollar invested than do the large farms in Iowa. STRANGE,
supra note 11, at 98. "In fact, the larger the farm the lower the output per dollar
invested." Id. When examining output per dollar at direct cash expenses, medium-
sized farms of 260-359 acres are the most efficient, not large farms. Id. These re-
sults were confirmed by a 1985 Congressional Budget office study, id. at 99, and by
two USDA studies. A 1967 USDA report, entitled The Economics of Scale in Farm-
ing, declares farms run by one or two persons to be at least equally, and often more,
efficient than large industrial farms. Lerza & Jacobson, supra note 23, at 242. An-
other USDA report submitted to a U.S. Senate subcommittee drew similar conclu-
sions. The report concluded the optimum size for a vegetable farm in California was
440 acres, but corporate farms dominating vegetable farming in California possess
an average of 3,206 acres. Hightower, supra note 26, at 207.
56. STRANGE, supra note 11, at 127.
57. Congress instituted the limitation in 1970. Id. at 128. In the 1960s the big-
gest 20% of farms received over half the benefits of most commodity programs, while
the smallest 40% received less than 10% of the benefits. Id. But the limitations did
not rectify this problem. The initial limit of $50,000 limited virtually no one, lower
limits were avoided by artificially splitting farms into smaller farms, and when big
farmers became eligible in 1983 for enormous cash payments in addition to surplus
commodities, "the Reagan administration arbitrarily suspended the payment limita-
tion in crops paid in kind." Id. at 129.
58. S. 2069, 99th Cong., 2d Ses. (1986). The Save the Family Farm Act sought
to reduce overproduction and increase the influence of family farmers' voices in cre-
ating farm programs. A nationwide farm referendum, including producers of all the
major commodities, would be held to allow farmers to choose the type of farm pro-
gram they want. When a referendum would pass, farmers would set aside 15% of
their tillable acres (to reduce overproduction). If greater set aside was required, pro-
ducers with gross incomes exceeding $200,000 would set aside a greater percentage
of their land. This was intended to create a disincentive to conglomerate and tax-
loss ventures. Tom Harkin, The Save the Family Farm Act, in Is THERE A MORAL
OBLIGATION TO SAVE THE FAMILy FARM, supra note 9, at 388, 394.
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tor Tom Harkin of Iowa, failed to pass. In contrast to other govern-
mental efforts, the Save the Family Farm Act sought to help only
family farmers. Its purpose was to move control of farm policy from
agribusiness-dominated Washington59 to a national farmer referen-
dum, giving one farmer one vote, thereby permitting farmers to cre-
ate their own farm programs.6 0
The other legislative effort, the 1985 Farm Bill, passed and
became the Food Security Act of 1985.61 The Senate Report for the
act states that the purpose of successful farm policy is to introduce
predictability into the otherwise unpredictable farming business. 62
The act sought to accomplish its goals by reducing loan rates and
freezing target commodity rates for two years. 63 Significantly, the
act forged a new trail in emphasizing environmentalism by condi-
tioning subsidies on better land stewardship.6 4
59. The federal agencies designed to regulate farming, the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have
been run by officials closely tied to agribusiness interests, as evidenced by the
number of agency officials that serve as corporate officials before and after their
agency tenure. Lerza & Jacobson, supra note 23, at 243-44.
A 1969 congressional report revealed that thirty-seven of forty-nine top FDA
officials who departed from the agency went to work for major food and drug corpora-
tions. Id. at 244.
In 1974, Virgil Wodicka, director of the Bureau of Foods, quit to become
a private consultant to industry; prior to his five-year sojourn with
FDA, Wodicka worked for Ralston Purina; Libby, McNeill and Libby;
and Hunt-Wesson (where he was vice president). The nutrition director
of the FDA also left his post in 1974 and joined the Hershey Corpora-
tion. In prior years, the same pattern was repeated. The FDA's general
counsel previously represented IT1-Continental Baking, dairy inter-
ests, and the chewing gum industry. The man he replaced as general
counsel, William Goodrich, left the FDA to become the president of the
Institute of Shortening and Edible Oils, an industry lobby. The man
Goodrich replaced was a former assistant commissioner of the FDA.
Id.
As the following situation. illustrates, the situation at USDA has been similar to
that of the FDA:
The secretary of agriculture from 1971 to 1976, Earl Butz, was formerly
a director of several agribusiness corporations including Ralston Purina
and Stokely Van Camp. Several of the top officials in USDA jumped
ship in the early seventies for the lusher environs of Continental Grain,
Miles Laboratories, and other corporations. In 1985 Ronald Reagan ap-
pointed Richard Lyng as secretary of agriculture. Lyng was formerly a
member of the National Livestock and Meat Board.
Id.
60. Harkin, supra note 58, at 392.
61. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (codified as amended mostly in scattered
sections of 7 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C. and 46 U.S.C.).
62. S. REP. No. 145, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985), reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1676, 1676.
63. GoZmAN, supra note 26, at 62.
64. The 1985 act required farmers who received crop subsidies from the USDA to
develop and use a conservation plan for land designated as erodible. Who's in con-
trol?, BiLuNGs GAZETTE, Apr. 26, 1992, at F12. This marked the first time farmers
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Although many proponents of the 1985 act thought it would
reduce government involvement in commodity markets, critics be-
lieve this did not happen.6 5 However, some in Washington declared
the 1985 act a success, including President Bush.66 The 1985 act
expired in 1990, but Congress passed a successor.6 7 The 1990 act
preserved the environmental commitment of the 1985 act by contin-
uing conservation techniques.6 8
could not receive subsidies without taking better care of their land. John Lancaster,
Study Says Soil Service Lags on Conservation; Enforcement of 1985 Measures Lack-
ing, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1991, at A7. "The idea was to use benefits as an incentive
for the control of erosion and other ecological change." Id. However, there have been
significant problems with enforcement of these measures. Id. Under the act, farm-
ers were given ten years to implement these plans to control soil erosion on land
considered highly erodible, which encompasses one-third of the Midwest's farmland.
George Gunset, Farmers' Annual Ritual: Spring Gamble Tillers of Soil Ponder Ways
to Reap Greatest Returns, Cm. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1992, at 3C.
65. Darrel Good, University of Illinois Cooperative Extension Service marketing
specialist, stated that this hope failed to materialize: "The government is no longer
in the grain storage business, but is a major determinant of export demand." Weekly
Outlook - Soviet Grain Demand, UPI, Sept. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, UPI File. Texas Agricultural Commissioner Jim Hightower echoed this cyni-
cism by proclaiming that despite Washington's proclaimed success of the 1985 act,
the bottom line revealed that the bill failed to help farmers since their share of the
consumer's food dollar shrank.
"Despite all the hubbub coming out of Washington proclaiming that the
1985 Farm Bill is a success, the truth is farming is still a losing proposi-
tion," said Hightower. The commissioner said food industry profits con-
tinue to rise while the farmers' share of the consumer food dollar
continues to fall. Texas farmers will earn only 2.8 cents for producing a
single serving of a 1989 Thanksgiving dinner that includes that in-
cludes turkey and all the trimmings, a government study said Tuesday.
Single Thanksgiving Meal Earns Texas Farmer 2.8 Cents, UPI, Nov. 14, 1988, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. Iowa Senator Tom Harkin echoed this sen-
timent: "If you talk about just putting some money in the farmers' pockets, I guess
you could say the '85 farm bill worked, but we borrowed a lot of money to do it. If you
look at it from the standpoint of what's happening in rural America, it hasn't
worked." Untitled, UPI, Aug. 17, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
66. President Bush declared the 1985 act a success when he signed its successor.
"Bush boasted that the new agriculture policy law 'builds on the success of the 1985
farm bill ... .'" President Bush signs New Five-year Farm Policy Bill, [1990] Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 230, at A-8 (Nov. 29, 1990). While a member of the
Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, Rudy Boschwitz of Minne-
sota stated that a General Accounting Office report underscored the 1985 act's suc-
cess. GAO Cites 1985 Farm Bill as Contributor to Improved U.S. Farm Economy,
[1989] 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 448 (Apr. 12, 1989). Boschwitz cited the
bill's assistance in recapturing export markets for U.S. farmers. Id.
67. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624,
104 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and
16 U.S.C.).
68. Wetlands Focus of Farm Conservation Effort, UPI, Jan. 18, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. However, the 1990 act actually improves the envi-
ronmental provisions by introducing a "sense of permanence" ensuring that the con-
servation techniques outlast the act itself. Purdue Experts Look at New Farm Bill,
UPI, Nov. 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexus Library, UPI File.
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Despite Congress' efforts to bolster and stabilize the farm
economy, many family farmers face bankruptcy and the loss of their
livelihoods. Recognizing this, Congress passed perhaps the most
significant legislation for the family farm: the Chapter 12 bank-
ruptcy act.6 9
Bankruptcy Law and the Family Farm
Before Chapter 12, farmers in need of bankruptcy protection
had to choose from Chapter 7: Liquidation,70 Chapter 11: Reorgani-
zation,71 and Chapter 13: Adjustment of Debts of an Individual
With Regular Income. 72 For various reasons, these chapters failed
to meet farmers' bankruptcy needs. The shortcomings of Chapters
7, 11, and 13 will be addressed in order.
Chapter 7 requires liquidation of the debtor estate's property
by a bankruptcy trustee. 73 Creditors can initiate an involuntary
Chapter 7 bankruptcy against a debtor, which posed a severe disad-
vantage for farmers before 1986.74 Due to the forced liquidation,
Chapter 7 works well for debtors with much unsecured or under-
secured debt and few valuable assets. However, farmers dislike liq-
uidation of their assets. Most farmers wish to continue farming by
reorganizing their debts. If they lose their land, they lose their live-
lihood. Moreover, many farmers hate to lose land passed down in
the family for generations. Hence, many farmers find Chapter 7
inadequate.
If the farmer must liquidate, a liquidating reorganization
under Chapters 11 or 13 works better for farmers than a Chapter 7
liquidation.75 While a Chapter 7 liquidation occurs rapidly under
69. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1988)).
70. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988).
71. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
72. Id. §§ 1301-1330.
73. Id. § 704(1). After the trustee reduces the property to money, the trustee
distributes the money to satisfy unsecured creditors' claims in a prioritized fashion.
Id. § 726.
74. Id. § 303. Currently, the bankruptcy code exempts "farmers" and "family
farmers" from involuntary bankruptcies. Id. § 303(a). However, before the enact-
ment of Chapter 12 in 1986, the bankruptcy code exempted only "farmers" from in-
voluntary bankruptcies. Since the statutory definition of "farmer" eliminates many
family farmers, many farm debtors were susceptible to involuntary bankruptcies
before 1986. To be a "farmer," over 80% of such person's gross income must come
from a farm owned or operated by the person. Id. § 101(19). On the other hand, to
be a "family farmer," only over 50% of such person's gross income must come from
the farming operation. Id. § 101(17).
75. JOHN C. ANDERSON & JEFFREY W. MORRIS, CHAPrER 12 FARM REORGANIZA-
TIONS § 1.01, at 1-4 (1987).
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trustee supervision, a reorganization liquidation progresses in an
orderly manner supervised by the debtor-farmer.76 Debtor supervi-
sion can work better for farmers with a financial stake in the farm
because they tend to know more about the property and have more
incentive than trustees to try to satisfy the creditor's claim. 77
Unlike Chapter 7, Chapter 11 allows the debtor to remain in
possession of the property. 78 Chapter 11 is rehabilitative, allowing
debtors to submit a plan of reorganization to work out their debt
problems.7 9 The debtor in possession is permitted to assume the
role of trustee.8 0 Courts appoint a trustee under Chapter 11 only
under limited circumstances. 81
Like Chapter 7, Chapter 11 is available to all forms of busi-
ness organizations, as well as individuals.82 An involuntary Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy is possible, as with Chapter 7, which seriously
affected some farmers before 1986.83 However, the Chapter 11
debtor possesses the exclusive right to file the reorganization
plan.8 4 After the debtor files the plan, the creditors must decide
76. Id.
77. Id. Because farmers work with farm equipment and have bought it them-
selves, they know more about its worth and how to receive the highest price. Some
farmers with a financial stake in the farm have greater incentive to receive a higher
price since they hope to pay off the debts and have money left for themselves. Some
wish to pay the debts off as a matter of pride.
78. Originally, Congress devised Chapter 11 to provide a remedy for businesspe-
ople, allowing them to continue their businesses. DANIEL R. CowANS, CowANs BANK-
RUPTCY LAw AND PRACTICE § 20.1 (1987).
79. Id. After bankruptcy is filed, the debtor proposes a plan of repayment for the
debts. The plan allows the debtor to continue the business, using the business' in-
come to make payments under the plan.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988). The bankruptcy code gives the debtor in possession
all the rights available for trustees to administer an estate, except for the right to
compensation. These rights include the right to continue operating the debtor's busi-
ness; to sell, use, or lease the debtor's property in the ordinary course of business; to
sell the estate's property free and clear of any liens outside the ordinary course of
business; to obtain credit; to reject, affirm, and assign executory contracts; and to
bring actions. JOHN C. ANDERSON, CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 8.03, at 8-5
(1992) (footnotes omitted).
81. The "court shall order the appointment of a trustee - (1) for cause, including
fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement.., or (2) if such appoint-
ment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests
of the estate .... " Id. § 1104(a).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1988). Only stockbrokers or commodity brokers are ex-
cluded. Id.
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
84. This occurs within 120 days of commencement of the action, unless the court
has appointed a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
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whether to accept it.85 After the creditors' decisions, the court de-
cides whether to confirm the plan.8 6
Even if some creditors reject the reorganization plan, the court
can still confirm it if at least one class of impaired claims confirms
the plan.8 7 This confirmation over creditors' objections is called
"cramdown." Before the court will confirm a reorganization plan
over creditors' objections, the plan must be "fair and equitable," re-
quiring that creditors receive the present value of their claim.
8 8
Because creditors need only receive the present value of their se-
cured interest under the cramdown provision, creditors' claims can,
in effect, be written down to the value of the collateral. The creditor
has an unsecured claim for the balance, but this, as a practical mat-
ter, is written off.
Unsecured creditors must receive the "value, as of the effective
date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim."89 Un-
secured creditors must receive payment in full before junior claim-
ants receive anything, which is known as the absolute priority
rule.9 0 This rule makes it hard for farm debtors to retain their
farms because the farmer is an equity holder whose claim remains
junior to the unsecured creditors' interests.9 1 Consequently, if the
creditors reject the farmer's plan, Chapter 11 does not provide
85. Id. § 1126. Under Chapter 11, the debtor must submit a disclosure state-
ment providing sufficient information for the creditor to make a knowledgeable deci-
sion. Id. § 1125. A class of claims accepts a plan if creditors holding "at least two-
thirds in amount and more than one-half in number of the allowed claims" accept the
plan. Id. § 1126(c). Unimpaired creditors are presumed to accept the plan. Id.
§ 1126(f). § 1124 describes when claims or interests are considered "impaired."
86. Id. § 1129.
87. Id.
88. A plan accepted by less than every class can only be confirmed if the follow-
ing two requirements are met: (1) the plan cannot discriminate unfairly between
classes and (2) the plan must be fair and equitable. Id. § 1129(b)(1). § 1129(b)(2)
describes the requirements for a plan to be fair and equitable with respect to the
various classes of creditors. To be "fair and equitable" to undersecured secured cred-
itors, the creditors must receive the "value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at
least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property." Id.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
89. Id. § 1129(b)(1)(B).
90. Id. § 1129(b)(2XB)(ii). Junior claimants are those creditors paid after a par-
ticular class of creditors. For example, because unsecured creditors are paid after
secured creditors, unsecured claimants are considered junior claimants with respect
to secured claimants.
91. An equity holder includes anyone owning a portion of the business: share-
holders of a corporation, partners in a partnership, and any owner of a business.
Hence, farmers are equity holders. The only way for equity holders to retain their
interest is to pay everyone ahead in full (to meet the rule of absolute priority) or get
everyone ahead of them to vote yes to a plan that allows them to be paid without
everyone ahead being paid in full (because § 1129(bX1) requirements do not have to
be met with respect to classes accepting the plan). Id. § 1129(bXl).
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enough help to farmers. Thus, besides its complexity, Chapter 11
does not always result in a plan that helps farmers survive bank-
ruptcy while keeping their farms intact.
Like Chapter 11, Chapter 13 is rehabilitative in nature and
requires a reorganization plan.92 Chapter 13 also has a cramdown
provision similar to Chapter 11's. 93 Hence, the reorganization plan
need not be accepted by unsecured creditors to be confirmed. After
an unsecured creditor objects, the court may approve the debtor's
plan if the creditor receives the present value of the claim, or the
debtor pays all of his or her disposable income into the plan for
three years.9 4 Hence, Chapter 13 eliminates Chapter l1's absolute
priority rule.95
Unlike Chapters 7 and 11, Chapter 13 may not be used by
partnerships or corporations, only by individuals with regular in-
come. 9 6 Chapter 13 does not permit involuntary bankruptcies since
only the debtor can file.97
Besides the fact that only the debtor can file a Chapter 13
plan, the main advantages of Chapter 13 for farmers are its simplic-
ity, low cost, and easier confirmation.9 8 Farmers can also obtain a
co-debtor stay under Chapter 13 to protect family and friends who
co-signed for consumer debts.99 Unfortunately, Chapter 13's debt
limits and exclusion of partnerships and corporations prevent many
family farmers from utilizing Chapter 13's benefits. 0 0
Chapter 12 bankruptcy was created specifically for family
farmers due to the other chapters' failure to adequately protect
92. Id. § 1322.
93. Id. § 1325(b).
94. Id. § 1325(b)(1).
95. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
96. The bankruptcy code states that "[oinly an individual with regular income
that owes... unsecured debts of less than $100,000 and ... secured debts of less
than $350,000' may use Chapter 13. Id. § 109(e). The code defines an individual
with regular income as an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regu-
lar to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under Chapter 13 of
this title, other than a stockholder or commodity broker." Id. § 101(29).
97. Id. § 1321. This benefitted many farmers before 1986 who were subject to
involuntary bankruptcies because they did not fit the statutory definition of
"farmer." See supra note 74.
98. Jeffrey L. Dull, Comment, Bankruptcy Chapter 12: How Many Family Farms
Can It Salvage?, 55 UMKC L. REv. 639, 653 (1987).
99. Chapter 13 provides a stay of action against co-debtors for "consumer debts."
11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1988).
100. A Chapter 13 debtor must be an individual. See supra note 96. However,
many family farms are organized as family partnerships or family corporations.
Moreover, Chapter 13 debtors must have less than $100,000 in unsecured debts and
less than $350,000 of secured debt, amounts easily exceeded by current costs of
farmland and farm equipment. Id.
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family farmers' interests.10 1 Before Congress enacted this chapter,
no provisions in the bankruptcy code specifically helped farmers
even though they encounter unique financial difficulties.' 0 2 Con-
gress enacted Chapter 12 on a trial basis, as evidenced by its sun-
set, or self-destructive, provision which states that Chapter 12 will
expire on October 1, 1993 if Congress fails to reenact it.103 Con-
gress limited the chapter to family farmers;104 hence, agribusiness
corporations cannot take advantage of its leniency.
One of the significant changes incorporated into Chapter 12 is
the new definition of "adequate protection." As with the other chap-
ters, under Chapter 12 a creditor can lift the automatic stay' 0 5 im-
posed by bankruptcy if the creditor's interest in the property is not
adequately protected. .0 6
Under the other chapters, courts' interpretation of "adequate
protection" caused a major problem for farmers. Chapter 12 sought
to change the definition by eliminating the other chapters' require-
ment that a debtor compensate the creditor for "lost opportunity
101. Chapter 12 became effective on November 26, 1986. The conference commit-
tee report states that most family farmers acquired too much debt to qualify for
Chapter 13 and thus, were forced to use Chapter 11, which many farmers found too
complex and expensive. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5249. Because of the farm crisis, Congress
drafted the new chapter to protect farm debtors.
[Chapter 12] is designed to give family farmers facing bankruptcy a
fighting chance to reorganize their debts and keep their land. It offers
family farmers the important protection from farm creditors that bank-
ruptcy provides while, at the same time. preventing abuse of the system
and ensuring that farm lenders receive a fair repayment.
Id. Congress enacted the new chapter specifically to help family farmers deal with
bankruptcy. Id.
102. Some of these risks result from the weather, inflation, and the economy.
Dull, supra note 98, at 642. Another unique risk farmers experience concerns harm
to animals. Paul C. Rosenblatt, FARMING IS IN OUR BLOOD: FARM FAMILIES IN Eco-
NOMIC Cimis 37 (1990). Furthermore, the farmer's illness poses a particularly great
threat to farming since the farmer's labor is essential to the business and cannot be
easily replaced for financial reasons and otherwise. Id. at 36. This health risk is
aggravated by the fact that farming remains one of the most dangerous occupations
in America. Sharon Schmickle, Bucolic Image Belies Farm Accident Rate: Each
Year, 1 in 7 Farms is Scene of Serious Injury, STAR TRIB., Jan. 18, 1992 at IA.
103. Act of Oct. 27, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(f), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124 (1986).
The drafters stated that the sunset provision was included because "Congress will
want to evaluate both whether the chapter is serving its purpose and whether there
is a continuing need for a special chapter for the family farmer." H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5249.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 101(19) (1988).
105. As soon as a petition for bankruptcy is filed under §§ 301, 302, or 303, of the
bankruptcy code, an automatic stay is imposed on actions of the creditor. Id.
§ 362(a). This stay prevents creditors from pursuing action against the debtor, the
debtor's property, or the debtor estate's property to satisfy creditors' claims or en-
force their liens.
106. Id. § 362(dX1).
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costs."107 Chapter 12 protects the value of the collateral, not the
creditor's interest in the collateral.OS Eliminating "lost opportu-
nity costs" illustrates Congress' Chapter 12 policy of favoring the
farm debtor because it places the burden of "lost opportunity costs"
on the lender. This reduces litigation costs, allowing family farm
debtors to concentrate on preparing a reorganization plan.X0 9
Another aspect of Chapter 12 benefitting farmers allows the
trustee to sell property without the creditor's consent.1 1 0 Chapter
12 also continued Chapter 13's elimination of the absolute priority
rule in cramdown.111 As in Chapter 13,112 an unsecured creditor
cannot prevent confirmation of a reorganization plan if the debtor
uses his disposable income to satisfy the plan for a specified
107. The legislative history states the following:
The Fourth and Ninth circuits have held that adequate protection re-
quires the debtor to compensate the secured creditor for so-called "lost
opportunity costs" in those cases where the value of the collateral is less
than the amount of debt secured by the collateral. In re American Mar-
iner Industries, Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); Grundy National
Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436 (4th Cir. 1985). The pay-
ment of lost opportunity costs requires the periodic payment of a sum of
cash equal to the interest that the undercollateralized secured creditor
might earn on an amount of money equal to the value of the collateral
securing the debt.
Lost opportunity costs payments present serious barriers to farm
reorganizations ... Family farmers are usually unable to pay lost op-
portunity costs.
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5250. Lost opportunity costs compensate creditors for invest-
ment opportunities creditors could have taken using the foreclosure proceeds, but
which are lost due to the delayed foreclosure.
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 1205(a) (1988). § 1205(a) states that § 361 "does not apply in
a case under this chapter." (§ 361 defines "adequate protection" for the other bank-
ruptcy chapters.) § 1205(b) defines "adequate protection" under Chapter 12. Most
significantly, § 1205(b)(1) inserts the phrase "value of property securing a claim or of
an entity's ownership interest in property" in place of § 361(1)'s phrase "value of
such entity's interest in such property." In § 1205(bX4), the aforementioned "value
of property phrase" is inserted in place of § 361(3)'s "indubitable equivalent of such
entity's interest in such property." These phrase replacements illustrate that Chap-
ter 12's drafters sought to change the focus from adequately protecting the creditor's
interest in the property, to instead, protect the collateral's value.
109. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5251.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 1206 (1988). The legislative history states that the provision's
purpose is to allow farm debtors to "scale down the size of their farming operations
by selling unnecessary property." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 50
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5246, 5251. This provision avoids the dead-
lock that had been occurring under Chapters 11 and 13 between creditors seeking to
dispose of land and equipment and creditors who thought they could get higher
prices by disposing of it themselves. David K McPhail, Bankruptcy: Determination
of an Appropriate Cram-down Interest Rate for the Family Farmer, 41 OKLA. L. REv.
489, 491 (1988).
111. See supra notes 90-91, 95 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 11:417
BANKRUPTCY AND FMHA LOANS
number of years. 113 However, under Chapter 12 the debtor may
have to contribute his income for a longer period of time: anywhere
from three to five years. 114
The possibility of paying a debtor for longer than three years
is one aspect of Chapter 12 favoring creditors. Certain provisions
were added to balance Chapter 12 with respect to creditors' con-
cerns. 115 For example, untimely filing results in a dismissal and
prevents refiling. 1l 6 Fraud can also result in a dismissal or conver-
sion to Chapter 7.117
Changes in the bankruptcy code and continuing government
involvement in farm-oriented legislation illustrate our govern-
ment's intent to preserve the family farm.' 18 The government has
established many programs and statutes to help the family farmer
through the farm crisis. However, since these programs sometimes
stray from their goals, courts must accept responsibility in imple-
menting Congress' express policy of helping family farmers. When
interpreting these statutes, courts must remember the purpose of
the statute. Interpreting present "value" in Chapter 12's cramdown
provision presents an opportunity for courts to read the statute's
plain language in light of the statute's purpose, as Part IV explains.
But first, Part III illustrates the ambiguity of present "value" by
examining the variety of ways courts have interpreted the phrase.
III. The Courts' Interpretation of the Cramdown Interest
Rate
Courts have used a number of methods for determining what
represents the present "value" of a secured claim under the
cramdown provisions of the bankruptcy code. The Fisher court
used the market rate of the loans to compute the claims' present
"value".119 Because the Fishers qualified for special FmHA loans
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) (1988).
114. Under Chapter 12 the judge has discretion to approve payments for more
than three years but less than five years. Id. § 1222(c).
115. McPhail, supra note 110, at 491.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1208(cX3) (1988). E.g., In re Braxton, 121 B.R. 632 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 1990).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1208(d) (1988). E.g., Reinbold v. Dewey County Bank, 942 F.2d
1304 (8th Cir. 1991).
118. In fact, during the Senate Agriculture Committee hearings on the confirma-
tion of Secretary of Agriculture Michael Espy, the chair of the committee, Senator
Patrick Leahy, reiterated Congress' commitment to the small, family farm. "[W]e
have to be committed to rural America. It can wait no longer. If we lose our small
family farms, we lose not only our rural heritage but the economic strength of our
rural communities." Hearing of the Senate Agriculture Committee, supra note 37.
119. The court of appeals remanded to the lower court the determination of this
"market rate." In re Fisher, 930 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1991).
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with low interest rates for limited-resource farmers, the Fishers ac-
tually owed more after filing for bankruptcy than before. There-
fore, the court's determination of present value penalized the
Fishers for using a special Congressional enactment, Chapter 12,
designed expressly to help family farmers manage their debts.
Such a result contradicts Chapter 12's purpose.
Courts can choose from a variety of interest rates when deter-
mining the present value of claims under the bankruptcy code's
cramdown provisions. One option is to take a preexisting rate, cre-
ated for another situation, and apply it to the bankruptcy case. For
example, some courts have applied the federal tax rate used by the
Internal Revenue Service to charge taxpayers for unpaid tax liabili-
ties.120 Another possibility is a statutory interest rate designed for
civil judgments.121 Other courts use a judgment rate as a starting
point, adding a premium to compensate for risk.122
Courts have also borrowed other lenders' interest rates, apply-
ing them to the bankruptcy context. Some courts apply the con-
sumer loan contract rate prevailing in the market when the
bankruptcy plan took effect.123 Other courts use the prime rate
commercial lenders quote to business borrowers,124 sometimes ad-
ding a risk factor to compensate for added risk.125 Another popular
rate is the treasury rate at which the government competes in the
money market with other borrowers.126 Courts have also held that
the rate should be determined uniquely in each case, based on the
120. In re Ziegler, 6 B.R. 3, 6 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). The court used the rate
established by the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6621. The court considered
the rate "reasonably responsive to current economic conditions" since it was "subject
to periodic revision," and the court thought using the rate did not impose "an unfair
burden on Chapter 13 debtors." Id.
121. In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365, 368 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). The court considered
the current legal rate of interest to be the proper rate to compensate the creditor for
delayed payments. Id.
122. In re Lum, 1 B.R. 186, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1979). The court examined
the judgment rate of 8% and arbitrarily added 2% to accomodate the creditor's inter-
ests. Id.
123. In re Benford, 14 B.R. 157, 160 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1981). The court chose the
prevailing market rate for consumer loans on the date the plan takes effect since it is
"responsive to changing economic conditions, yet provides ... a reasonably certain
and uniform method for calculating the long-term equivalent of a claim's present
value." Id.
124. In re Hudock, 124 B.R. 532, 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991). The court chose the
prime rate since it represented the borrower's cost of money, permitting "the market
to make the necessary risk assessment." Id.
125. In re Patterson, 86 B.R. 226, 228-29 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988). The court fa-
vored adjusting the prime interest rate for bankruptcy loans to reflect the added
risk. Moreover, the court held that because prime rate is generally lower than mar-
ket, a higher risk factor can be used. Id.
126. U.S. v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir. 1989). The court upheld using
the treasury bond rate, adding a 2% risk factor. Id.
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interest rate the debtor would have to pay in the open market, con-
sidering the risks.127
Courts can also use compensatory rates or rates alleviating
hardships. Courts have used interest rates equalling the creditor's
cost of funds.128 Courts have also averaged several rates to elimi-
nate the hardship of applying one interest rate.12 9 Other courts
rely on experts who testify to the appropriate interest rate in a par-
ticular context.13 0
A final, and seemingly most reasonable, rate for family farm
debtors is some form of the contract rate itself. Some courts keep
the contract rate unchanged.131 Other courts use the "prevailing
market rate... with a maximum limitation on such rate to be the
underlying contract rate of interest."'13 2 A further possibility is to
use the contract rate as a presumption13 3 and go from there.
None of these possible rates is perfect. The rates created for
other situations and borrowed by bankruptcy courts invariably dis-
favor one party by incorporating other context's external factors. 134
Rates compensating the lender for the cost of funds or reinvestment
rate are difficult to calculate.135 The averaging rate is somewhat
127. In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503,
1508 (9th Cir. 1987). After examining various possible rates, the court concluded
that the rate should be determined on a case-by-case basis according to open market
standards. Id.
128. In re Hardzog, 74 B.R. 701, 703 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987). The court used
the cost of funds as the appropriate interest rate because it thought the rate properly
balanced creditor and debtor interests. The court left the determination of the cost
of funds to a case-by-case determination and instead, simply stated that the cost of
funds "should reflect the actual rate the creditor must pay to obtain the replacement
funds." Id.
129. See In re Hyden, 10 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980). Because the case
involved an installment sales contract, the court concluded it was appropriate to av-
erage the state's statutory interest rate for installment sales contracts, the contract
interest rate, and an arbitrary "leveling factor" of 6%. Id.
130. In re Moore, 25 B.R. 131, 134 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). The court relies on
the "uncontradicted testimony of the debtor's expert at the trial' in establishing the
interest rate. Id. at 28.
131. In re Thorne, 34 B.R. 428, 431 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
132. In re Colgrove, 771 F.2d 119, 123 (6th Cir. 1985).
133. In re Smith, 4 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
134. Because the rates were established for completely different contexts, the in-
terest rates reflect different risks. For example, rates designed for judicial proceed-
ings take different factors into account than prime rates commercial lenders quote to
business borrowers. Choosing between these rates poses a significant challenge for a
court since none exactly reflects the rate agreed to between the debtor and creditor.
135. For example, because interest rates fluctuate in the market, an interest rate
designed to equal the creditor's cost of funds would have to be continuously read-
justed to exactly compensate the creditor. McPhail, supra note 110, at 500.
Furthermore, the name "compensatory" is somewhat of a misnomer. Using mar-
ket rates (as courts do when attempting to compensate the lender) does not ade-
quately compensate a commercial lender because a bankruptcy loan poses great risk
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arbitrary,1 3 6 and the expert rate often leads to a battle of experts
creating uncertainty, introducing delay, and increasing cost.137
Either party may be disadvantaged by the contract rate because of
fluctuations in current rates.
Selecting any of these rates forces a court to make difficult de-
cisions in characterizing the loan.138 When characterizing the loan,
courts should take the nature of the loan into account and treat
commercial loans differently from loans under special government
programs. Special government loans are isolated from market
forces, and this isolation should not be sacrificed by filing for
bankruptcy. 139
Hence, regardless of the rates courts apply in other contexts,
FmHA loans should be treated uniquely. Such treatment has legal
precedent. In re Doud140 stated that "[t]reatment of the FmHA
loans must be viewed in light of the agency's mission to provide
and does not represent a voluntary agreement between debtor and creditor. Hence,
using rates designed for voluntary loans does not "compensate" the lender for a
bankruptcy loan.
136. Averaging several rates may result in a rate that bears no relation to the
original loan or to protecting either the lender's or the creditor's interests. It simply
side-steps the problem of having to decide on one rate.
137. Matter of Wichmann, 77 B.R. 718, 720 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1987) (in light of such
problems, the court expressly rejected rate determination methods requiring expert
testimony in every case). Another court rejected methods requiring expert testimony
for similar reasons: delay, cost, and differential abilities of the parties to hire ex-
perts. In re Shannon, 100 B.R. 913, 933 n.47 (S.D. Ohio 1989). Expert testimony can
also potentially create wide variation "in rates for similarly situated debtors," which,
in turn, encourages litigation. In re Neff, 89 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
When the experts disagree, courts can choose one expert's testimony over another,
see In re Stratford Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 145 B.R. 689, 703 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992),
or courts can choose their own rate, using expert testimony as a guide, see In re Oaks
Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991).
138. Selecting among these rates inevitably forces courts to characterize the "new
loan," i.e. the repayment schedule as set out in the reorganization plan. Courts must
decide whether to view the loan as first, voluntary or forced, and second, as being
made at the time of the original loan or the bankruptcy plan confirmation. Some
courts select the rate by characterizing the loan as a voluntary loan between the
creditor and a solvent similar debtor. Then these courts decide whether to use rates
prevailing at the time the loan was made (e.g. the contract rate) or when the bank-
ruptcy plan is confirmed (e.g. the market rate). Other courts take the bankruptcy
context into account and view the loan as a forced loan to an insolvent debtor. These
courts often add risk factors to other contexts' interest rates to compensate for the
loan's involuntariness due to the debtor's poor financial condition. In a sense, this
rationale is artificial in that if a lender actually took the bankruptcy context into
account, the lender would not make the loan at all. By adding these risk factors,
courts are really trying to give the creditors a little extra for the extended time and
the written-off portion of unsecured debt, essentially balancing the pro-debtor provi-
sions of bankruptcy against the creditors' interests.
139. Since the market rate never applied to special low interest government loans
when they were incurred, courts should not use market rates to set the interest rates
for these loans in a bankruptcy plan.
140. 74 B.R. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
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credit to family farmers who are unable to obtain credit from con-
ventional sources."141
Doud relies on another decision, Curry v. Block,142 which held
that a Congressional enactment should be interpreted in light of
the "evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question."143
After examining the history of the FmHA, the Curry court con-
cluded that the FmHA's purpose is "predominantly a form of social
welfare legislation."144 The court determined that "Congress ...
refutes the notion that the [FmHA] is strictly a business ven-
ture."145 Therefore, when interpreting the section at issue146 the
court said it must "attempt to implement the social welfare goals of
Congress as well as its directive to keep 'existing farm operations
operating .... "147
Doud and Curry rely on the Supreme Court's characterization
in United States v. Kimbell Foods 148 of the FmHA's lending pro-
grams as "forms of social welfare... [whose purpose] ... is to assist
the underprivileged farmer."149 In Kimbell Foods, the Court con-
trasted the collection of taxes with repayment of FmHA loans.150
The Court emphasized that collecting taxes was much more impor-
tant than collecting outstanding FmHA loans. "The overriding pur-
pose of the tax lien statute obviously is to ensure prompt revenue
collection," but the same cannot be said of FmHA loans. 151 "[FmHA
loans] are a form of social welfare legislation, primarily designed to
assist farmers... that cannot obtain funds from private lenders on
reasonable terms."'5 2
Reasoning from the analyses in Curry and Kimbell Foods, the
Doud court held that the contract rate should be applied to the low
interest rate FmHA loans at issue, rather than the market rate.153
The court stated, "It would be incongruous indeed if a farmer who
on one hand qualified for FmHA protections because of high risk
141. Id. at 870 (citing Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982), af'd 738
F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1984)).
142. 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982), affd 738 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1984).
143. Id. at 509 (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976)).
144. Id. at 514.
145. Id. at 513.
146. 7 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1982 Supp.). This was a 1978 amendment to the Consoli-
dated Farm and Rural Development Act entitled "Loan moratorium and policy on
foreclosures." Id. at 508.
147. Id. at 514.
148. 440 U.S. 715 (1978).
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id. at 734.
151. Id. at 734-35.
152. Id. at 735.
153. In re Doud, 74 B.R. 865, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
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characteristics would on the other hand be required to forgo these
protections to proceed under Chapter 12." 154
Doud's result comports with Curry v. Block's conclusion that
the FmHA is not a "business venture."'5 5 The market rate should
be saved for loans to business ventures. Due to their nonprofitable
purpose, social welfare loans' interest rates should remain below
market rates after bankrputcy, just as before bankruptcy.
Other cases have adhered to Doud's reasoning. In re
Schaall56 concluded that "determination of the interest rate to be
applied must be viewed in light of FmHA's purpose of providing
credit to farmers."'L 7 The court also stated that "FmHA lending
programs have been characterized as forms of social welfare and
the purpose of the programs is to assist the underprivileged
farmer."' 58 The court held that the interest rates of the FmHA's
limited resource loan program should apply if the debtors remain
qualified for the program.159
The same court deciding Doud reaffirmed its holding in Matter
of Simmons :160
This court acknowledged that the FmHA's mission is to provide
credit to family farmers who are unable to obtain conventional
credit and found that application of the conventional loan calcu-
lation would thwart this mission. Implicit in this holding is a
recognition that commercial banks are indeed different from
the FmHA. The most obvious difference is that the FmHA
lends money to those that commercial banks refuse at interest
rates generally below market rates.... There is no reason to
ignore the FmHA's mission and place all risk on the debtor just
because the FmHA borrower filed bankruptcy.'61
Hence, the court emphasized the difference between commercial
banks and the FmHA when rejecting the FmHA's argument for the
commercial loan rate.16 2
Some courts, however, have rejected treating FmHA loans
uniquely. Arnold v. Porter163 held that a different rule should not
apply to special FmHA loans, 164 and other courts have adhered to
154. Id. (citation omitted).
155. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
156. 93 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988).
157. Id. at 647 (citing Curry v. Block, 541 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D. Ga. 1982)).
158. Id. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 735 (1979)).
159. Id.
160. 86 B.R. 160 (S.D. Bankr. Iowa 1988).
161. Id. at 162.
162. Id.
163. 878 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1989).
164. The FmHA loan in that case was described as an "interest credit" whereby
the original contract rate of 9% was waived, and an interest rate of only 1% applied
when bankruptcy was filed. Id. at 926.
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Arnold's holding. 165 In Arnold the debtors' plan proposed that they
continue paying the special interest rate on one note until periodic
review by the FmHA revealed the debtors no longer qualified, at
which time the rate would revert to a higher rate.166 This solution
was created to alleviate the concern expressed in an earlier case, In
re Kesterson.167 The Kesterson court worried that debtors would
use the FmHA's limited resource operating loans' low interest rates
without complying with applicable rules and regulations, such as
the annual review. 168
The Arnold court rejected the debtors' plan, stating, "we note
that the FmHA is generally treated as other creditors .... and in
any event had Congress intended a different rule, it could have so
provided in Chapter 12."169 This assertion is incorrect on two
grounds. First, as Kimbell Foods demonstrates, the Supreme Court
does not treat the FmHA as other creditors. In Kimbell Foods the
Court explicitly called the FmHA lending program "social welfare
legislation" available for farmers unable to borrow from "private
lenders."'170 Second, as discussed later, relying on Congress' silence
remains very tenuous. 171 Silence is ambiguous and just as easily
can support the proposition that treating FmHA loans uniquely is
permissible since the statute does not forbid such treatment.
As described earlier, courts, such as in Doud, Curry, and Kim-
bell Foods, have permitted pro-family farm legislation to treat fam-
ily farmers uniquely both in the bankruptcy context172 and in other
contexts.173 The reasoning underlying these cases supports unique
treatment of FmHA loans. In any event, a special exception should
165. Courts have followed Arnold's lead in applying the market rate to FmHA
loans. In re Case, 115 B.R. 666, 671 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990); In re Branch, 127 B.R.
891 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991). Another court cited Fisher and Arnold as establishing
the prevailing market rate as the appropriate interest rate. In re Mason, No. 90-
21413, 1991 WL 145844, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. Aug. 2, 1991). Mason rejected the
debtor's proposed interest rate of 5% for an FmHA loan, concluding that the debtor
failed to prove this was an "appropriate rate." Id. Another creditor's expert testified
that the current rate for "such loans [as FmHA loan] was between 10.25% to
13.75%." Id.
166. 878 F.2d at 926.
167. 94 B.R. 561, 562 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987).
168. The court did not want debtors using only the best features of the program,
i.e., the low interest rates, while failing to adhere to the program's rules and regula-
tions. Id. Such rules and regulations include "annual review and possible conver-
sion to standard Farmers Home Administration loan terms." Id.
169. Id. at 930 (citation omitted).
170. 440 F.2d at 735.
171. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 141-62 and accompanying text.
173. MSM Farms v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 65
(1991) (upholding the constitutionality of statutes limiting the ownership of farm
and ranch land to family farmers).
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certainly be created for FmHA's limited-resource operating loans.
Based on this analysis, Fisher was wrongly decided, as the follow-
ing section explains in greater detail.
IV. Fisher's Flawed Reasoning
The loans at issue in Fisher were limited-resource operating
loans that the FmHA offers at below market interest rates to farm-
ers starting out, undercapitalized farmers, and farmers unable to
qualify for conventional loans.174 To obtain one of these loans, the
Fishers had to satisfy the FmHA's special program requirements.
The FmHA required that they own or run a small or family farm,
satisfy a low income requirement, fail to qualify for conventional
loans, demonstrate poor managerial skills, possess only a limited
education, and remain unable to maintain a reasonable standard of
living without the reduced loan rate. 175
The Fishers filed for Chapter 12 bankruptcy on July 26, 1988,
and on September 9, 1988, the FmHA filed a proof of claim for the
loans to the Fishers.176 Because the Fishers lacked adequate col-
lateral to satisfy the claims, the claims were written down under
Chapter 12's cramdown provision.177 The reorganization plan in-
cludes proposed interest rates, and if any secured creditors object to
these rates, the court can "cram" the proposed discount rate "down"
on the creditors. Before a court can confirm the plan over a credi-
tor's objection, the creditor must receive the present "value" of the
creditor's secured claim.178
In Fisher, the debtors proposed to repay their FmHA limited-
resource operating loans, taken out at below market interest rates
of 7.25%, 4.5%, and 4.5%, at a weighted average of 5.41%. The
FmHA objected, claiming that this rate failed to provide the present
value of the loans. The bankruptcy court179 and the district
174. 930 F.2d at 1362.
175. Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. §§ 1941.4(h), 1943.4(h)).
176. Id.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1988). This provision states the following:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan
if-
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan-
(B)(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the
property to be distributed by the trustee or the debtor
under the plan on account of such claim is not less
than the amount of such claim.
178. Id.
179. In re Fisher, 930 F.2d 1361, 1361 (8th Cir. 1991).
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court' 8 0 approved the contract rate proposed by the debtors, in-
stead of the market rate proposed by the creditors, because the con-
tract rate promoted the FmHA's policy of assisting disadvantaged
farmers.' 8 ' The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed,
following the Sixth Circuit case, U.S. v. Arnold,I8 2 by relying on
Chapter 12's plain language.
The Fisher court decided to use the market rate, although it
did not decide how to compute the market rate; instead, it re-
manded this issue to the lower court.'8 3 Because the market rate
exceeds the original FmHA rate, the Fisher decision effectively
makes very poor farmers pay more for their loans after declaring
bankruptcy. The rate at which loans are paid back can mean the
difference between recovering from bankruptcy and losing the farm.
Requiring limited-resource farmers to pay interest rates
higher than the original contract rate does not make sense logically
or as a matter of policy. The purpose of bankruptcy is to protect
debtors while they reorganize their loans.' 8 4 Making these farm-
ers pay more nullifies this protection premise. Congress' overriding
purpose behind enacting Chapter 12 was to preserve the family
farm.185 This purpose supports using the contract rate as the
proper interest rate since a poor family farmer declaring bank-
ruptcy would be more likely to be able to meet the lower contract
rate payments than higher market rate payments. A closer exami-
nation of Fisher reveals the court's flawed reasoning.
The Eighth Circuit focuses on the plain language of the
cramdown provision.' 8 6 When interpreting the statute, the court
relies on the fact that the cramdown provision makes no distinction
between the present value of claims resulting from special pro-
grams, like the FmHA's limited-resource operating loans, and loans
from other lenders.I8 7 This resembles the Conan Doyle approach to
statutory interpretation, in which courts hold that silence relates
something about the statute.'8 8 However, the Supreme Court has
180. Id.
181. 930 F.2d at 1363.
182. 878 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1989). See also supra notes 164-69 and accompanying
text.
183. 930 F.2d at 1364.
184. ANDERSON & MoRRs, supra note 75, § 1.03, at 1-12.
185. See supra note 101.
186. For the text of the cramdown provision, see supra note 177.
187. 930 F.2d at 1363.
188. This derives from Doyle's Sherlock Holmes mystery "Silver Blaze," in which
a dog's silence told Sherlock information to help solve a mystery:
[A] dog was kept in the stables, and yet, though someone had been in
and fetched out a horse, he had not barked enough to arouse the two
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rejected this dubious canon of statutory interpretation.i8 9 More-
over, silence can be interpreted to "say" different things. The Ar-
nold court states that silence means FmHA loans cannot be treated
uniquely since this is not expressly mentioned. However, con-
versely, since special treatment is not expressly prohibited, the si-
lence could also be interpreted to mean that FmHA loans can be
treated uniquely. Silence is very ambiguous, and hence, serves as a
poor foundation for statutory interpretation.
The Eighth Circuit asserts that the district court ignored the
cramdown provision's language and wrote into the statute a re-
quirement that the FmHA must continue to subsidize the debtors
under the favorable terms of the original loan, even though the orig-
inal loan ceased to exist after the debtors filed bankruptcy. 190 This
reasoning ignores the relationship between the original loan and
the post-bankruptcy loan. The two are inextricably linked: Chapter
12 is designed to allow creation of a new loan that the debtor can
pay, based on the original loan's terms.
Furthermore, the Fisher court's heavy reliance on the provi-
sion's "plain language" appears precarious in light of the ambiguity
of the cramdown provision and the continued litigation concerning
"value."'191 Because the language is not determinative, the legisla-
tive history and policy behind the statute should be examined.192
Chapter 12's legislative history fails to define "value." Thus, the
general policy behind Chapter 12 sheds the most light on this provi-
sion's language.
The Fisher court describes the policy behind the enactment of
Chapter 12. The court states, "Chapter 12 was created to 'give farm
families facing bankruptcy a fighting chance to reorganize their
lads in the loft. Obviously the midnight visitor was someone whom the
dog knew well.
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HoLMEs 335,
339 (Doubleday & Company 1930) (1893). Although this canon usually applies to the
legislative history's silence, the underlying reasoning equally applies to silence of the
statutory language.
189. The Supreme Court states,
In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner
of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark.
Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980).
190. Id.
191. See supra part III.
192. The Supreme Court has held that when a statute is deemed ambiguous, the
legislative history and overall structure should be examined. Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co. 490 U.S. 504, 508-09 (1989). In fact, the Supreme Court effectively held
that legislative history and purpose can trump the plain meaning of a statute, i.e.
that anibiguity in the plain meaning is not required before examining the legislative
history. In Green v. Bock Laundry the Supreme Court concluded that the plain lan-
guage of the statute at issue "can't mean what it says." Id. at 511.
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debts and to keep their land.'" 193 However, the court's decision con-
tradicts this purpose. The Fisher court ignored the In re Doud194
case, also from the Eighth Circuit. Doud's policy-based analysis
held that the contract rate should apply to FmHA loans.195
Chapter 12's legislative history states that the purpose of
Chapter 12 is to protect farm debtors while securing fair repayment
for the creditor.196 This purpose supports using the contract rate.
The contract rate would undoubtedly protect the debtors since the
rate remains below the market rate. The contract rate should be
considered fair for creditors since they originally agreed on this
rate. Furthermore, in this context the creditor is a federal agency,
the FmHA, established to serve limited-resource farmers; fair re-
payment should be based on rates at which the agency usually
lends money, which are below the market rate.
If courts fail to maintain the contract rate in FmHA farm
bankruptcy cases, an absurd result occurs: when the debtors need
the most protection, they receive the least protection. The contract
rate would not only further the general purpose of Chapter 12 but
also would further the purpose of the FmHA loans. FmHA loans
differ from conventional loans, and as a result, courts should treat
these loans differently.
Arnold interpreted the cramdown provision to be a compro-
mise between the debtor and creditor,197 and the Fisher court relied
on this to use the higher market rate for these risky loans.198 How-
ever, when the creditor is a federal agency set up to provide low-
interest loans to low income people, the agency deals with high risk
loans on a regular basis. It makes no sense to compensate the gov-
ernment as a lender for risks it is obligated to assume.
Since the agency was created for the express purpose of aiding
disadvantaged farmers, agreeing to accept the loan's contract rate
appears reasonable. Fisher underscores the issue of whom the
FmHA serves.199 The FmHA's lending practices have been criti-
193. 930 F.2d at 1362 (citing H.R. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5249-50).
194. 74 B.R. 865 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1987).
195. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
196. It offers family farmers the important protection from farm creditors
that bankruptcy provides while, at the same time, preventing abuse of
the system and ensuring that farm lenders receive a fair repayment.
H.R. REP. No. 958, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5246, 5249.
197. 878 F.2d at 928.
198. 930 F.2d at 1364.
199. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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cized frequently in recent years. 20 0 Resulting legislative reform
and case law have made the FmHA's actions more borrower-
friendly.201 Finding the contract rate to be appropriate would fol-
low the trend of restoring the FmHA to its original purpose of aid-
ing poor farmers.
Even if the Eighth Circuit does not embrace the contract rate
in all FmHA farm bankruptcy cases, a special exception should be
made for FmHA limited-resource operating loans. The loans at is-
sue in Fisher were limited-resource operating loans. Doud and In
re Simmons202 held that all FmHA loans should be treated
uniquely. But other cases, such as In re Schaal,203 created an ex-
ception only for limited-resource operating loans. Even under this
more restricted holding, since the Fishers qualify for the program,
they should get the limited-resource operating loan rates.
The Eight Circuit's Fisher decision undermines the policy of
preserving family farms by inserting its own interpretation of "fair-
ness." Fisher's heavy emphasis on creditors' rights in a Chapter 12
bankruptcy should be saved for a more appropriate case involving
private lenders, not a case involving a government agency estab-
lished specifically to help underprivileged family farmers.
Conclusion
"The family farm has become a rare species, nearly extinct."20 4
Traditionally, the family farm assumed an essential role in the set-
tling and building of America. Congress' efforts to preserve family
farms evidences its support of them, but the efforts often fail to
achieve their goals. Existing programs often stray from Congress'
intentions. The courts remain the last refuge in many cases to
guide these programs back onto course.
Fisher was wrongly decided in light of Congress' purpose in
passing Chapter 12. Because the loans at issue were limited-re-
source operating loans, the Eighth Circuit should have used the
contract rate for the cramdown interest rate. Fisher provided an
opportunity for the court to help one of Congress' programs return
200. Neil D. Hamilton, The Role of the Law in American Agriculture, 38 DRAKE L.
REV. 573, 577-78 n.8 (1989).
201. Id. One of the most significant cases influencing FmHA reform was Curry v.
Block, 541 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Ga. 1982). For a general discussion of how this case
affected the FmHA's lending practices, see Guy R. Montag, FmHA Loan Servicing:
Alternatives to Foreclosure, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 561 (1986).
202. 86 B.R. 160 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988).
203. 93 B.R. 644 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988). Schaal held that FmHA's limited re-
source loan interest rates would apply if the debtors qualify for the program. Id. at
647.
204. Kirkendall, supra note 10, at 96.
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to its intended path, but the court failed to seize the chance. Future
opportunities will undoubtedly present themselves, and the courts
must recognize and utilize their power to help family farm legisla-
tion achieve its goals. Family farmers have played an important
role in our nation. The courts can help Congress ensure that they
continue to do so.

